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Absrak
kkhalfaban Abbasjahyng berlangsung selama lina abad lebih tekb
mengalami masa pasang sun'i d.engan dinanika lang tingi. Di nasa
kej a1 aarqt a, ke khalifah an Ab b asil ab nereprese n tasi kan <anan
keemasan Islan dengan ken{uan peradabannla. Namun dalam nasa
surntnla, Abbasjah telah jatah dalam dominasi penguasa asing,
ternastk amir al-umara' dari dinasti Bryid. Para pengilasa niliterlang
nutinla tunduk kepada khalfab ini justru telah nenainkan peranlang
jauh lebih menenkrkan, bahkan lebih berkuasa dari khalifuh sendiri.
Fauzan Saleh
Hal ini terladi karena hnahrya posisi khalfah, sehingga horpi, seluruh
bak dan kewenangannla dianbil alih ohh penguasa militer tersebat.
Dalan kondisi seperti iu kbalifah tidak lcbih dari penguasa tituler atau
bahkan "uta1aflg" di bantab cengkeraman dinasti Bajd. Persoalannla
kenudian, jika nnrang kbartfah tidak lagi na@t menjalankan tugasnla
sebagai kEak flegara atau pemerintahary banskah ia dipertaltankat.
Menurut al-Mawmdi, khahfab seperti itu tidak berhak lagi nenduduki
jabatannla dan ia ltarus ditunnkan. Namtn, meskipm para khalfah
Abbasiyah nlab kehilangan keksasaan eksekutifnla, mereka ternlata
nasib dapat mempertahankan ktdildukan mcnka, bahkan hinga jauh
setelah kekuasaan dinasti Bryid ita sendii bancur. Bagi kaan Sunni,
seperti apa pun bentuknla, keberadaan kbalifuh barus tetap
dipertabankan sebagai sinbol penerintaban lang sab dan sebagai
nanfestasi dai kuauan selantb amat Islam.
Keywords: puppet caliphs, vizietate, amir al-umma', administtation of
revenue, the state expenditure.
A.Introduction
Theoretically, the caliphate is the symbol of the essential and
necessary political unity of the Muslim World- Although the Muslim
religious unity has been symbolized mostlyin their dailyworship, fasting
in Ramadan and pilgrimage to Mecca, etc., but the business of the
caliph is the administration of the affairs of their wodd in the widest
sense. Therefore, to call any leader a caliph means to asseft his right to
administer the affairs of the Muslim world. As the head of the Muslim
world, at least for a lar:ge portion of ig the caliph should be freely
elected by the people or nominated by his predecessor and then
accepted by the people. Accordingly the caliph's power is of the people
who have decided themselves to be voluntarily governed by a single
individual who is given absolute Power and implicitly deserves
obedience as long as he maintains the essential aw of Islam.l In
addition, as the head of the Muslim world and the symbolic
representative of its unity, the caliph, who has to administer all the
affairs of Islam-both religrous and secular-has another obligatory
function to watch ovef the purity of Islamic doctrines and their
I D.B. Macdonald, "The Caliphate," Tbe Moslcn lYoild,vol.7 (1917),pp.349-
350.
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applications. But as the successor of the Prophet, howevet, he can
otrty defend and apply those already given forth and defined. In other
*ord., he can only administer what is accepted as being of Islam.2
The Abbasid caliphate emerged through a revolution n 132/
749,Led,by Abu Muslim al-Khurrasanl, Ab[ Salamah M[sa, and Abu
al-Abbas. Considerably, this revolution was an attempt to feconstfuct
the Islamic polity, to reintegrate the rulers and the ruled in rhe ummah
under the leadership of the family of the Prophet. Thus the Abbasid
caliphate was the extension of the eadier caliphate, in which the
position of Muhammad as the executive and head of the governing
authority was filled by a caliPh.3
In performing his duty as the head of the Muslim world, it was
ineviable that the caliph should have made a special artangement of
his office, dealingwith the division of his authority. At the head of the
state there was the caliph, who was, at least in theory, the fountainhead
of all power, of even representing the authority of God on the earth,
kbaffatAllih'ali al-Ar/ (bestowed for the first time on al-Mutawakkil,
232-247 /847-86D.4In exercising his civil authority, the caliph could
and did delegate it to the vizier (wa{l\ and of his iudicial pou/ef to a
j"d1-^ @Lq@, and of his military function to a general (r*t\. However,
the caliph remained the final arbiter of all governmental affairs.s Thus,
there were three official itutions under the caliphate, namely: Vbiente,
judicial administration, and amTr al-mari'.
Viqierate. The vizier stood next to the caliph. He was the
repfesentative of the caliph throughout the land. He must be obeyed
'? Maiid Khadduri, lYarazdPeaa in the l-ant of Islan @aftimore: TheJohn Hopkins
Press, 1955), pp. 11-12.
I Hugh Kennedy, Tbe PrEbu and the Age of the Calipbates Q,ondon and New
York Longman, 1989), pp. 127-128.
n Al-Marvardi reiected this idea and suggested that the caliph is called' khalfah
because he succeeds the Prophet of God. The reason is that the caliph is the representative
of someone who is absent or dead. But God is neither absent nor dead. Thus when
Abu Bakr, the first rightly guided caliph, was addressed " O, caliph of God," he
spontaneously replied aI am not the caliph of God but caliph of the Prophet of God."
Sie Abu al-Hasanal-Mawardi, al-Altkin al-sil1anlah (cairo: Matba'at al-Sa'adah, 1909),
P.1s.- s Phnip K. Him, Hisarl of the Arabs (-ondon: Macmillan and Co-, 1937), p'
317.
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like the caliph, since he urho disobeys the vizier disobeys the caliph,
which means he disobeys God as well, and God will cause him to
enter hell-fire. This izier was often very powerful, appointing and
deposing governors and judges, although, theoreticdlg this had to be
with consent of the caliph. He could also transmit his own office
according to the hereditary principle, and confiscate the property of
the governor who fell from grace.6 The vizier was the chairperson of
the council whose members included the various heads of the
departrnents of state. But sometimes those heads were also designated
viziers. Origina[y, this vizierate belonged to the ."liph. Bug after al-
Muqtadir Q95-320/908-932), this institution was supplanted and
annexed by anir al-ummi'.1
ludicial administratioa. This post was considered a religious
institution, entrusted by the ."liph or his vizier to a member of the
fqTb fiurist) class, who thus became r qi&, and the one being posted
in Baghdad" as the capital oF the 6aliF hate, became qi6 at-qadit, the
chief iudge. There vrcre two types of iudgeships: The one had a general
and absolute authodty (innab nullaqah), and the other had a special
and limited authodty. The chief duties of the first were deciding cases,
acting as guardian of the orphans, lunatics and minors, administering
pious foundations, imposing punishment on violators of the religious
law, and appointing iudicial deputies @nnnib, sing. naT'b) in the various
ptovince. The iudge of the second class, which had speciel and limited
authority, was restricted to performing special duties appointed by the
caliph or the vizier of the governor.s
The amTr al-smari'. Originally, the institution of the amir ol-tmara'
refers to the military organizaion. But as a constitutional status, it
refers to the caliph 
"l-Md P22-329/934-940),who for the first timehad to bestow this office on Ibn al-Ra'iq, n 324/ 936. The latet was
made ailh al-umari' with the comprehensive power over the army, the
management of taxes and public security in the whole region of the
state. From this time on, the real power remained with this amTr al-
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administtators to command. Moreover, the arrival of Ibn al-Ra'iq as
amTr al-unari'also meant the end of the old vizierate, whose office
was then conducted by the anir a/-anam's secretary.e
This condition was even worsened by the interference of the
Buyids who arrived at Baghdad in 334/946, and put themselves as
amTr al-umari'. Beside grasping the above authority over the army and
the management of taxes which deprived the caliphs of their political
prerogatives, the Buyids, who professed Shi'ism, also interfered in the
field of lgligious zffurs. Having no pou/ef to administer public affurs,
the caliphs could not prevent the introduction of the Shi'ite traditions,
such as the public mourning on the anniversary of Husayn's death, the
rejoicing on 'Id al-Ghadr (18e of Dhn al-Hiiiah), and the cursing of
Mu'awiyah and other companions of the Prophet in the khu/bab.
Introducing such traditions in the court of the caliph was really a heresy
in the view of the caliph who was traditionally the custodian of the
Sunni faith.10 Based on the reahty that all political, military and even
lsligious affaus were directed by the Buyid anirs, it is interesting to
examine how the caliphs functioned as the heads of the Muslim wodd
under the Buyids reign.
B. The Buyids' Political Emergence
The Buyids or Buwayhids were a Persian dynasty, founded by
Abu Shuja'B[ya or Buwayh. They claimed to have descended from
the Sasanian king Bahram Gor, but some historians afe still uncertain
about the allegation, and decide that their genealogical table should go
back only to the king's ftst minister, Mihr Narse.11 In spite of the fact
that Abu Shuia' Buya, as a chief of warlike nomadic tribe had akezdy
played an important role in the suuggle bet'ween the Alids and the
Samanids, the real founders of the dynasty were his three sons, 'A[,
Hasan and Ahmad.r2
e H. Kennedy, The PrEhet and the Age of the Caliphate,p. 797.
10 Mafizullah Kabk, The Buwalhid D1nasfl of Baghdad (Calcutta: Iran Society,
1964),p.194.
1r K.V Zettersteen, "Buyids or Buwayhids l' The Engchpedia of Islan,1" edition,
vol. 1, p. 807. Dealing with their genealogical table, see Ibn al-Ailfu, al-Kinilf al-Tii-kh
@eirut Dar al-Sadr, 1966), vol. 8,pp.264-265.t2 lbid.
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The Buyids originated from Daylam, a mountainous hintedand
on the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, a region bounded by
Tabaristan to the east, JibAl to the south, Gilan to the north-west, and
the Caspian Sea to the north-east. Its inhabitants, known as Daylamites,
were hardy and wadike devoting themselves as volunteers in the Persian
atmy.13
Before Islam was introduced to this region, the Daylamites had
Iived in ignorance of any established lgligions, and some of them were
Magians. Islam was frst inuoduced to them by the Zaiydtte imams,
F.Iasan b. Zayd, his brother, Muhammad, and F.Iasan b. 'A[ al-'Utrush
(the deafl. They summoned the people there to accept Islam, and many
of them accepted it as the true faith, but some of them, a small minority
who lived in the inaccessible areas in high mounains and in the remote
valleys, remained ignorant of it.la
Having been successfrrl in converting them to Islam, these Zaydi
imams could establish independent dynasties in the neighboring
provinces of Tabarisan. They contrived not only to secrue allegiance
of these tribes but also to enlist them as enthusiastic fighters for their
beliefs.ls Later on, al-'Uuush, allied uzith local rulers, attempted to
conquer the whole South Caspian area, but, in spite of their ftequent
military campaigns, they could not establish *y independent state.
The real power at the time was held by the local chiefs, notably the
Ziyaid kings of Gilan and the Justanids of Daylam who eventually
were fortunate in taking advantage of Abbasid weakness.l6
After the death of al-'Uthtush n 304/977, a civil war broke out
between his son and son-in-lawwhich provided an oppornrnity for the
adventures of Daylamites and Gilites (the people of Gilan) to rise
into prominence as military leaden. Among these adventrrers were
Makan b. K-akl who began his career in the service of al-'Utrush; As6r
b. Shiruya and Mardawii b. Ziyat who had been in service to Samanids
13 M. Kabir, The Bwailtid Dlnas!, p. l.
la Abu al-F.Iasan al-Mas'id" Tbe Meadows of tbe Gotd: Tbe Abbarid,translated and
edited by Paul Lunde and Caroline Stone (.ondon and New York Kegan Paul
International, 1,9 89), p. 425.
15 M. Kabir, The Bwalhid D1rcsfr , p. 2.
'6 H. Kennedy, Tbe PrEbx and tbe Age of the Caliphates, p.213.
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of Khurrasan and Ttansoxania, respectively.lT It was in such a
circumstance that the Buyid brothers, 'A[, F.Iasan and Afrmad, began
their appearance on the historical scene by devoting themselves as
fighters in the army of M-akan b. K-akl.18 But aqother account Proves
that the Daylamite adventurers could have nade their expansion
southward because of the withdrawal of Ibn A6i al-SAj, the Abbasid
governor in Azerbujan,from his post in northern frontier of the empire'
In 314/926Ibn Abj al-Saj was ordered by the Caliph al-Muqtadir to
move southward to fight the Qarmatians who had established their
foothold in Bahrain.le Considering that his post in Azetbaiian was more
important in safeguatding the empire against the most dangerous
attackers from Daylamites, Ibn Abl al-Sai reluctandy took the order.
He himself had reminded the caliph that if he had to abandon the
frontier, somethingmore grievous than the affairs of Qarmatians would
befall and this might even cause a desttuction of the empire on all
sides. However, he eventually moved southward to Kufah to fight
against the Qarmauans in 314/926. Unfortunately he was defeated,
captured and then assassinated. His expenditure was completely a
failure.20
Thus, by the departure of Ibn Abl al-Sai with his army from the
northern frontier the way to move southward was then accessible to
the Daylamites. Among those three Daylamite ad.venturers, Mardawii
b. Ziyar was more victorious than the other two. He could have
conquered Rayy, Isfahan and Tabaristan n 31'5/927. Asf-ar b. Shituya,
although he had occupied Rayy and Qazwayn before, was then killed
in a dispute with Mardawrj. On the other hand, Makan b. KAE, in
sprte of being supported by the Samanids, was also defeated and driven
out of Tabaristan, and finally fled away to Kirman.21 On the defeat of
Makan b. KAE, the Buyid brothers, 'A[ and F.Iasan, solicited his
17 M. Kabir, The Buwafuid D1nasi,p. 2.
18 lbid.
le H. Kennedy, The PrEbet and tbe Age of tbe Calipbate,p- 213.
m M. Kabir, The Buwafiid Dlnas! of Bagltdad,p. 3, quoting aI-Tanul<hi, Ni;war al-
Mnbidarah,vol 1, pp. 153-154.
n Abu A[ b. Muhammad Miskawtyh,TQirub al-Unan @aghdad: al-Muthanna,
1914), vol. 1,p.277; uanslated into English by H.F Amedtoze and D.S. Margoliouth
asTbeEclipu of theAbbatidCaliphate(Oxford:BasilBlachwell, 1921),vol. 4,p.374.
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permission to desert to Mardawij's ranks in order to lighten his burden
which he had to support after his defeat. The t'wo Buyids promised to
come back to Makanwhenever his luckimproved in the future. Makan,
admitting his poor condition, approved their request and let them leave
his ranks. \tr(rhen the two Buyids were accepted by Mardawij with honors,
many of Makan's commanders were attracted to follow in their steps,
and there was no way for Makan to restrain them. Mardawij then
proceeded to place them in control of theJibal areas: 'A[, for instance,
was appointed to control al-Ktri, Lashkari b. Murdi to contol
Dinawand, and Sulayman b. Sirkala to control Hamadhan, etc.z
Having been in Mardawij's service as a ruler of al-Karai, 'A[
was able to recruit followers and became a military leader in his ourn
right. But later on, Mardawiiwas suspicious of his loyalty, and therefore
he postponed the appointment. But it was also because of 'Afi's
independent nature which soon brought him into conflict with
Mardawij. Thus, n 321/932 he moved southu/ard with about 300
Daylamite followers, taking direction of Isfahan. Isfahan was under
the control of Abu ^l-F^ttr b. Yaq[t with about ten thousand troops,
with Ibn Rusam as his minister of kbarQ @nd tax). 'A[ b. Buwayh
tried to assrre them that he was deserting to them and desired to enter
Ibn Y6qut's service. But they did not approve his request, especially
Ibn Rustam who disliked 'A[ very much. Yet, an unanticipated accident
happened that Ibn Rustam died at the time when Ibn Yaqut left the
city, follourcd by about 600 of his uoops. M*y of the other troops,
having heard of 'AIi's liberality and generosiry deserted to him.
Eventually the batde between 'A[ and Ibn Yaqfit unavoidably broke
up in 321/932. The latter, having been weakened by his troops'
desertion and being aware of their disorders, fled to Fars. 'A[ then
occupied Isfahan and obtained his fame by defeating thousands of Ibn
Yaqut's troops with only some hundreds of his followers.a
However, 'A[ did not stay in this newly conquered region for a
very long time. Mardawij, who was afraid that his followers would also
2Ibn al-Atlir, Al-Kanilf al-Tiikb,voL 8, p. 267; Miskawayh,T4jirub al-Unan,
vol. 1,,p.277.
a Miskawayh, T@irxb al-Umam,vol. l, p. 279.
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deserted to 'A[ for the above reason, planned to send message of friendly
remonstrance brought by his brother, Wushmagir. But 'Afi. was
suspicious and considered that the message was incompatible with the
armed.prep anionmade by Wushmagit in delivering the message. Thus
he decided to evacuate Isfahan soon after collecting its revenues for a
month.2a He directed himself toward ArrariaLn which was governed by
Ab[ Bakr b. )liq[t, the son of Abu al-Fat]r b. )-aq[t, who had fled to
Ramahurmuzbefore 'A['s arrival. There,'A[ obtained alatge sum of
wealth to increase his power without any fight. While he was still in
this region, he also got a message from Abu Talib Zayd b. A[ of
Naubandajan, a land owner and withholdet of the revenues of the
caliph's estate in Fars. He invited'AIi b. Buwayh and suggested him to
march against Shiraz, a capital crty of Fars. This city of Shiraz, less
than a hundred kilometers southward from Naubandaian, fell under
the control of Abu al-Fatfr b. Yaqut. The latter refused to pay the
revenue he had collected to Baghdad and even used it to build up his
own force.25
Being more concerned with maintaining the prosperity of his
region against the deprivation of Ibn )Aqut's undisciplined atmy,Ztyd
agreed to support and finance'A[ b. Buwayh and his men at a cost of
200,000 dinars. Thus the later could have acquired a foothold in the
region before he had to deal with Ibn )hqut. Moreover, the alliance of
Buyids and Fars landowners was to be the foundations of the would-
be Buyid state.26
In 321./933'A[ b. Buwayh arrived with about 900 Daylamite
supporters, and began to establish his authority in the new region. Soon
after that he sent his brother, $asan, to collect dues from nearby
Kazatunand other areas of Fars. In the following year, 'A[ had to deal
with Ibn Yaq[t's army. He was about to escape eastward to Kirman,
because his army was too small compared with that of Ibn Yaq[q
which numbered about 17,000 men. Battle was inevitably joined in
322/934. But, in spite of the great difference in numbers, Ibn Yaq[Cs
2a lbid.,p.280.
2s H. Kennedy,The PrEhet and the Age of the Caliphates,p- 214.
26 Miskawayh, The Eclipn of the Abbatid Caliphate,vol. 4, p. 336.
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undisciplined army fled in disorder and 'A[ definitely won the battle.
Eventually, the road to the capitalof the region, Shiraz, was then widely
open.27
After establishing his powerwithin Fars, 'A[ then tried to expand
his interest in the wider affurs of the Islamic world. The first srep was
to secure the consent of the caliph for his actions by promising the
Abbasid envoy to pay tribute, although he could never frrlfil such a
promise. Another affur that attracted his concern was the conflict
between the Samanids of Khurrasan and a local advenrurer,
Muhammad b. Ilyas on the eastern frontier of Fars. .A[ decided that
his youngest brother, Atrmad, try to establish himself there, and he
sent him with a small force of Daylamites and rurks. But it was not so
easy for Afrmad to manage, because at the same time he also had to
deal with the Qufs and Balukh mountain-people in the south-east of
the province. Flis brother then sent him more troops, but Ibn Ilyas
remained too powerfirl. It was not for another fourteen years that the
Buyids could hold the area.28
A more serious problem to be faced by ,A.[ was in central Iran,
where Mardawij b. ziyat uras still the prominent pou/er. He rejected
the authority of the Abbasid caliphate entirely and demanded to restore
the Iranian monarchy. More seriously, he sought to replace Islam as
the formal .,"1. lgligion with the old Zotoasttnn faith, mainly by
reviving the old ceremonies of fire worship.2e Thus his death at the
hands of his Turkish troops in 323/935 was recorded with some
satisfaction by Muslim',vriters.3' He is known as the last power ro uy
to dam up the tide of Islam in lran, and such an effort was virnra\
responsible for his death. Accordingly, all subsequent rulers of Iran,
with no exception of Buyids, were carefirl to show their attachment to
Islam, even when they tried to revive their ancient political glodes.31
n lbid.,p.337.
28 H. Kennedy,The PrEhet and tbe Age of the Calipbate,p.2l5.D lbid,,p.216.
s An account of Mardawiit assassination is recotded in Mskawayh's TQirab at-
Umam,vol.l,pp.312-375; Ibn al-Atlirt al Kanilf al-Tiikl, vol. 8, pp. 298-303.31 H. Kennedy, The Propbet ad the Age of the Calipbans, p.2ie .
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The vacuum of authority caused by the death of Mardawii opened
up further opportunities for the Buyids. f,Iasan, the second Buyid
brother who had been a hostage with Mardawii since 'A-[ began his
career as Mardawij's governot n al-Kataj, not only managed to escape
ftom the latter's custody, but also embarked on a further campaign to
occupy Isfahan, and even threatened Rayy, the heardand of Mardawii's
authority.32In the meantime, Afrmad, the youngest of the Buyids, turned
to Iraq after his failure in Kirman.33 His campaign was favored by the
unstable situation existing in the caliphate, especially because of the
rivalries between military adventurers for the tide of amir al-umari'.In
addition, he was also supported by the Baridis, powerful and grasping
tax-farmers in southern Iraq, who were trying to secrre independence
from the caliphate.3a
In332/944 Ahmad attempted to seize Baghdad for the first time,
through the way of $7as-ip, but was beaten off by Tuzun, aTurkish amir
al-umari'.3s But a year and half lateE when T[zun dted (early 334/
945), the long awaited oppornrnity for Afrmad then arrived. On the
other hand, the death of T[zun caused confusion among the army
who were throurn into disorder. But then they agreed to appoint Ab[
Ja'far b. Shirzad as their chief, and they swote allegiance to him. Ibn
Shirzad then sent a messenger to the Catiph al-Mustakfi with the request
that he would swear an oath of fidelity. The request was frrlfilled by al-
Mustakfi with a ceremonial entry on horseback into the palace, and
Ibn Shirzad became the new amTr al-amar7.36
Based on the fzctthatlbn Shirzad came to power by the support
of the army, it was natural that, in their turn, the army demanded him
to increase their wages. Such a demand, which had to be frrlfilled by
the ruler, inevitably produced financial stress upon the state's
expenditures. Among the attempts taken by Ibn Shirzad to fulfi.ll this
demand was the sending of zn envoy to Nasir al-Dawlah, the former
32 Miskawayh, The Eclipn of the Abbasid Caliphate,vol. 4'pp.356-357.
33 For further discussion of his battle in Kirman see Miskawayh, Ta1irub al-
[Jmam,voL T,pp. 354-356: Ibn al-At]ir a l-Kinilf al-Tiikl, vol. 8, pp. 324-326.
3a Ibn al-Athir, Ibid.,p.340.
35lbid.,p.408.
% Ibid,,p.448.
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an1r al-umari'of Baghdad.3T In response to Ibn Shirzad's request, he
sent meal and money amounting to 500,000 dirhams. Ibn Shirzad atso
began to confiscate the wealth of some of the state officials, imposing
quotas on clerks, merchants and others. Moreover, he employed some
informants or spies to investigate the citizens who were suspected of
having stores of wheat or other goods for the use of their ourn families.
These actions taken by Ibn Shirzad unfailingly caused serious troubles
to the city, such as the increase of bulgaries, lack of public security,
and even famine. Moreover, because of such a situation, many traders
had to flee from Baghdad and Ibn Shirzad's rule became unpopular.3s
Upon such a'condition, Yintl Kusha, the minister of public
security in S7adip, who had corresponded with Ahmad before, invited
the latter to penetrate Baghdad. News was then received that Ahmad
and his men had departed from Ahwaz in the dircction of the czpital.
The Turks and the Daylamites there were alarmed and were prepared
to take every possible risk for his arrival. They encamped in the oraitory
(nusalli)3e beyond the Tigris river. Ibn Shirzad was reported as also
encamping there togetherwith his army. Bug later on, he and the Caliph
al-Musakfi went into hidi"S. In the meantime, when the Turks were
sure that both of them had gone into hiding, they crossed to the westem
bank of the Tigris river and fled away to Mousil. On the other hand,
when al-Mustkafi u/as ascertained that the Turks had left the city, he
appeared and returned to his palace. Thus, Ahmad b. Buwayh could
enter Baghdad peacefully withoui any opposition.o
Prior to his arrival at the city, Ahmad sent his agent, Abu
Muhammad Hasan al-Mulrallabi, to negotiate with Ibn Shirzad in his
concealment (about which is uncertain), and aftervatd proceeded to
the palace of al-Mustakfi. There the caliph expressed his delightfulness
3? He held the office of amir al-umari' for a short term, in 330-331 / 941 -942, and
was defeated by Tuzun, upon which he fled to Mousil and became the ruler of the
region.
38 Miskawayh, The Eclipu of tbe Abbasid Cakpbate,vol. 5, p. 86.3e Musalli or or^tory, as mentioned in al-Mas'ud's Tbi Meadows of tbe Gold,
means "an area marked off for prayer on special occasions, usually in the open air.,' See,
I bid., p. 433 (Glossary).
4 Ibn al-A*ir, A l-Kini I f a l-Tiikb, vol. 8, pp. 449 -450; Miskawayh, T h e E clip se
of the Abbasid Caliphate,vol.5, pp. 87-88.
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at the ?djfrv2llof Ahmad b. Buwayh and assured the agent that he had
been hiding from the Turks in order that their powef might disperse,
by which Ahmad could install himself in Baghdad without trouble.
On Saturday,Jumada al-Tharfr 77,334/Jmuary 77,946, Ahmad arrived
at the Shammastilyah Gate (north-eastern entrance of the ciry), and
was welcomed by al-Mustakfi. There Ahmad declared his fidelity to
the caliph and swore to pfesefve al-Mustakfi's secretary and other
people of the caliph's household. \7hen the ceremony of swearing
was ovef, Afrmad b. Buwayh Put on his official robe of amTr al-ttnari'
and was conferred with a honorific itle, Ma'izz al-Dawlah. Not only
did Alrmad receive such a tide. His brothers, A[ and $asan also got
the titles of 'Imad al-Dawlah and Rukn al-Dawlah, respectively.al
Mofeover, orders were issued that their tides and kunlahs should be
suuck on the coinage.az Thus, the year 334/946 is marked as the
beginning of the Buyids' reign of Baghdad.
Having occupied the office of anir al-umari'for less than two
weeks, Mu'izz al-Dawlah Ahmad affested the Caliph al-Mustakfi for
the reason that the latter had been conspiring apinst him. The account
of Miskawayh teveals rhat a stewardess of the caliph was once found
gri"g L gte t banquet to a member of the Daylamite commanders.
The anTr Mu'izz al-Dawlah was suspicious that such a banquet was
meant as a sinister move for gaining their promises of allegiance to the
caliph and for detaching the army leaders from the an1r. On the other
hand, the amhwasalso informed that al-Mustakfi had arrested al-Shaf i,
the Shi'ite leader of Baghdad, and an attempt made by Igfahdost, one
of the Daylamite dignitaries, to release him was reiected by the .rtlph.
Being distressed by the treatrment' T,,"fahdost went and told the anTr
that the caliph sent a message for Igfahdost, asking him to meet the
caliph disguised in boots and a cloak. No certain result of this meeting
was made known, and Mu'izz al-Dawlah, accordingly, resolved to
a1 These "humble" titles, which mean by turn "Sffengthener of the State,"
"Pillar of the State" and "Prop of the State," were only apretended showof submission,
asMu'bzal-Dawlah, for instance, did not hesitate to put forth his authority whenever
the opportunity allowed him to, as will be discussed latet See Thomas !( AtnoId,The
Calip h a te (Oxford: Clarendon Pre ss, 19 24), p. 67.
a2 Ibn al-Athlr,Al-Kinilf al-Tiikh,vol.8, p. 450-
ALJanlah, Yol. 42, No.1, 2004/1425 H 13
Fauzan Saleh
depose al-Mustakfi from his throne.a3
The account of Miskawayh says further that on Thursday,Jumada
al-Thtnl 8,334 Qanaary 29,946),Mu'izzal-Dawlah came to the palace
with no one's suspicion. When the caliph sat upon his throne and the
people stood up according to their ranks, Mu''nz al-Dawlah entered.
After some ceremonial courtesies in honor of the caliph, he began to
talk with him. The amlr then asked for the caliph's permission to
introduce an envoy coming from Khurrasan and another from Abu al-
Qasim al-Badd. The two envoys, who wete Daylamites, advanced
and stretched out their hands to al-Musakfi. The latter, supposing
that they desired to kiss his hand, suetched it out toward them. The
t'uo Daylamites, talking loudly in Persian, pulled the caliph abruptly
down to the earth, t'wisted his turban round his nec\ and dragged him
on foot to the palace of Mrfizz al-Dawlah where he was kept a prisoner
and his eyes were put out. Thus ended the days of al-Mustakfi,s
caliphate. On the same day, M'u'uz al-Dawlah then summoned Ab[
al-Qasim al-Farjl, the son of al-Muqadir, to the throne as a new caliph.
He took the name al-Mufr'li-lEh, the obedient to God.4
Based on the above consideration, the Buyid history as also
recorded by Kennedy can be divided into trvo different periods. The
first is from the setdement of 'A[ b. Buwayh in Fars n 322/933 up to
the death of 'Adud al-Dawlah, the greatest Buyid ruler, in 372/983, rc
a period of growth and consolidation. During this period the political
initiative was firmly in the hands of the ruling amirl The second is
from the time of A{ud al-Dawlah's death until the decline of the
dynasty by the arwalof the Seliuk sultan Tughrel Beg and the disposal
of al-Malik al-Ratilm, the last Buyid ani-r, n M7 /7055.45
Whatever the periodizaion could be, the Buyid era is often
considered as confusing and full of marches, batdes and succession
disputes. It is even more complicated as there were at least three or
more centers of activity which at the same time were closely
_ _a Miskawayh,Tbe Eclipse of tbeAbbaid Cartphate,vol. 5, p. 89; Ibn al-Ath:irt, al-
Kanilf al-Tiikl, vol. 8, p. 450.
a Ibn al-Atfrt,Ibid.
as H. Kennedy, The PrEhet and tbe Age of tbe Calipbatu,p.2l7.
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interconnected.a6 But it does not necessarily mean that the Buyid era
was merely a gloomy period of Islamic history. Although for litde time,
the Abbasid state under the Buyids' reign could have enioyed the art
of peace and prosperity. K.V. Zettercteen, at the end of his article
'Buyids or Buwayhid," explains:
The Buyids, with the exception of 'Adud al-Dawlah, had litde time for
tlle arts of peace. It is to 'Adud al-Dawlah' honor that he found time
to attend to the domestic development of his kingdom as far as lay in
his power, by encouraging poets and scholars, building mosques,
hospitals and other public buildings, repaidng canals and wells which
had become filled up and gmnting funds from the state ueasury for
the relief of the poor. This period of peaceful prosperity was of but
short duration and after his death the kingdom resumed its downward
coufse,47
Although the Buyid dynasty still continued a few years longer in
Fars, the rule of this dynasty is generally considered as to have come
to an end with the arrest of al-Malik al-Mtrim n 447/1,055, because
he was the last of the house to rdn in Baghdad. Al-Malik 
"l-Mtti-
was first obliged to acknowledge the suzerainty of Tughrel Beg, the
Seljuk sultan, who had emerged to power by invading Khuzistan and
Ahwaz, a few months prior to his farnous entry to Baghdad. Although
at first Tughrel Beg did not undertake any change in al-Malik al-Mhim's
rule, a riot breaking out in Baghdad the day after his arrival was
attributed to al-Malik al-Rafrim's intrigue. Therupon Tughrel Beg
arrested him togetherwith many of his supPorters and the Buyid khulbah
was finally abolished in Baghdad. Al-Malik al-Rahim was then deported
to Rayy in which he was confined in a casde and remained there until
his death in about 450/7059.48
However, it is not intended to discuss the whole account of the
Buyid emirate in this paper. But the above exposition seems necessary
in order to illustrate how the Buyids, since their eady teign in Baghdad,
penetrated into the house of the caliphate and began to conttol the
46 lbid.q K.Y.Zettetsteen, "Buyids or Buwayhids," p. 808.
4 Harold Bowen, "The Last Buwayhids," The Jounal of the Royl Asiatic Socielt
(April 1 929), pp. 237 -238.
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government of the empire itself by enthroning and dethroning the
caliphs at will. on the other hand, the discussion of the Buyid political
emergence would help us to understand the historical backgound of
the Abbasid caliphate during this era, and accordingly would be the
basis of our discussion of how the Abbasid 6alirrhate, as an Islamic
state, was overshadowed by the Shi'ite Buyids.
C. The Abbasid State Under the Buyids' Reign
The Buyids had only a litde experience in ruling the settled
govefirment, since in a very short time they rose from a simple tribal
life to be masters of the vast region* That could he the reason why
their administration of the Abbasid state was virtually a continuation
of the existing system by which these regions has been pteviously
governed, disregarding the ftct that,later, they also made some
innovations, particulady dealing with a system of military fiefs.ae
1. The Position of the Cdiphs vis-i-vis the Buyid Amirs
But before we proceed to discuss this issue, it is necessary to see
the position of the caliph vis-i-vis the Buyid amlrs 1n brief. The Buyid
emirate extended for about 110 years, beginning ftom334/946, when
At-rmad b. Buwayh seized Baghdad and held the office of amTr al-amari'.
During this period, there were five caliphs ruling concurrently with
their emirates: al-Mustakfi bi-UAh e34 / 9 46), al-Mud. li-lEh e34-363 /
9 46-97 4), ?J-Ti'1' li-llth Q63-381, / 97 4-991), al-Qtdtu bi-lEh e9l -422 /
991-1031), and al-Qa'im bi-Amrillah. The last is the only caliph who
survived until the end of the Buyid rebn by the arrival of the Seljukids
n 447 /1'055. of these five caliphs, each of the first three was deposed
in turn, and only the fourth, al-Q;dir, died while still exercising his
office.so
As a constitutional institution, the establish ment of amh ar-umari'
refers for the first time to the date when the Caliph 
"l-Md e22-329/934-940) offered Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Ra'iq to undertake the
management of the state which was under serious financial stress. The
ae M. Kabir, Tbe Bryid Dlnas! of Bagbdad,pp.llg-120.
n lbid.,p.1,86.
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caliph was compelled to do so because the vlzier ^t thut time, Abu al-
Qasim Sulayman b. F.Iasan, \I/as unequal to the iob and could not
maintain his authority. Many sources of revenues were cut off by the
governors of the provinces, such as \)Uasip, Basra, Ahwaz and some
others. The affairs happened simultaneously with the Buyids' military
campaign by seizing Fars. Thus the caliph, having no pov/er to control
the situation, appointed Ibn Ra'iq as anlir al-umari'and entrusted him
with the adminisuation of the kharQ,public security in all the provinces
and the management of the empire in general.sl
By this appointment, the caliph had actually alrcady surrendered
all his affafus, both civil and military, to the anTr al-amari' znd
accordingly he lost his authority to control them. But still more seriously,
this lost was experienced by the vizier whose position was then uncertain
whether as an officer of the caliph or as a nominee of the amir al-
umara'.If the collection of revenues was undertaken by the anTr al-
umari'then the caliph did not need a iaier any longer. Nevertheless
he firmly held his prerogative of maintaining a vtzier until the arcivaJ'
of.Mu'izz al-Dawlah at Baghdad and his appointment of new amir al-
amari'by the Caliph al-Mustakfi, 334/946.s2 Thus, the vizier became
completely powedess and no longer had authority to control the
provinces as well as the state administration' What remained as his
right was metely the tide and the ceremonial ^pPearance in a black
robe in the palace, but there he kept silent without any official
statement to declare. The whole business of the state now fell under
the control of Ibn R.a'iq and his secretary, as reported by Miskawayh in
the following quotation:
The revenue from the provinces is ttansmitted to the treasury of the
anlrr, they order and prohibit everything regarding it and expend it as
they please while remitting what they choose to the sultin (the Caliph)
for his expenses. The old treasuries ceased to exist.s3
When Mu''tzz al-Dawlah began his reign as anir al-unari' he did
not raise the question of vizier of his own, because all the works
s1 Miskawayh, The Eclipv of the Abbaid Caliphate,vol. 4, p. 395.
52 M. Kabir, The Buwalbid D1nasry of Baghdad, p. 190.
5r Miskawayh, The Edipse of the Abbasid Caliphate,vol. 4, p. 396.
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previously done by the vizier were nou/ undertaken by his secretaries.
On the other hand, the caliph could no longer hold his prerogative of
maintaining his vizier and instead he had only a secretary to look after
his fiefs. This seemed to be an alteration intentionally made by Mu.nz
al-Da'wlah bywhich, once people had been accustomed to the situation,
he could appoint his own secretary as vizier; and al-Mufl', who had
been raised to the throne by Mrfizz al-Dawlah, had no choice but to
accept this new arrangement acidy. The vizierate norfi/ passed into the
hands of Mu'lz:z al-Dawlah ufio could choose whomsoever he liked.il
Since then, the caliph was merely a stipendiary, receiving two
thousand dirhams a dry for his personal expenses. Later on, as its
payment seemed to be inconsisteng Mrfizz al-Dawlah, in addition to
that, granted some fiefs known u fua-'al-khidmabto the caliph, allowing
him to get two hundred thousand dinars more annually whose
management was underaken by the cdiph's secretary, Abu Ahmad al-
Fafl b. Abd al-Rahman al-Shida55
Being only a stipendiary, the cdiph was frequendy subjected to
humiliation by the Buyids. [n370/982, to mention but a few examples
of these humiliations, A{ud al-Daurlah went toJib-al for an expedition.
Upon his retum ftom this expedition, he senthis mento Baghdadasking
the Caliph al-Mu!'to go out of the .ity i" order to welcome him. The
caliph, although hbhly relucant to comply had no alternative but to
do so.s6 On another occasion, the caliph was asked to make
conuibutions for the holy war ftom his personal income.sT It was not
only because he had insufficient funds for his own wants that he could
5a Ibn al-Atlir, al-Kinilf al-Tiikb,vol. 8, p. 452.
ss Miskavrayh, Tajinb al-Unam,vol. 2, pp. 107-108. A nore given by M. Kabir
shows that the ratio between dinar and dirham fluctuated ftom time to time. Under the
caliph Harun al-Raslid itwas 1:22, and ftom al-Mustaqdir's time down to the death of
Adud al-Dawlahwas 1:20. See M. Kab:u,TbeBtwalbidDlmrg of Baghdad,p. 166.
s6 M. Kabir, Ibid.,p.193, quoting Ibn al-Jawzr, al-Mltttaqaa,vot. Z, p. tO+.
s7 The holy war in rhis eventvras the war against Byzantines e63 / 974) who had
been taiding Nissibin and killing a large number of Muslims. The Muslims demanded
that the anTrBakhtiyar lead them in this holy war. Bur as he thought that the caliph al-
Mufr'had hoarded a gteat deal of money, he demanded him to make his contributions.
See M.S. Khan, "The Effectof lqta-'I-and-gttrt) System under the Buwayhids,,, Islamic
Culture, vol. 58 (1984), p. 290.
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not fulfil such a fequest, but also because he felt that all the authority
upon the army and the management of the Uoops had been surrendered
to the am7r. The caliph's reply' as reported by Miskawayh, shows us
how poor the position of the caliph was under the Buld occupation:
The sacred war would be incumbent oo me if the wodd were in my
hands and if I had the management of the arrny and dre uoops. As
things are, when all I have is a pitance insufficient for my want, and the
wodd is in your hands and those of provincial rulers, neither the sacted
rvar nor the pilgrimage nof afiy other matter requfuing the attention of
the sovereign is any concern of mine. All you can claim from me is the
name which is uttered n the kba.tbah from yout pulpits as a means of
pacifring your subjects and if you wish me to renounce that privilege
ioo, I am prepated to do so and leave everything to you's8
All these humiliations, according to Thomas rJfl Arnold, rendered
the fact that the Buyids were Shi'ites and therefore they did not really
recognize the claim of the Sunni caliph to the supreme headship of
the Islamic world.se
In spite of the above ill-treatment inflicted by the Buyids, there
was still one aspect in which the catiph could hold his authority. This
dealt with the formal recognition of the caliph by gi"g the legal
validity to the de facto rulers. It uras only the authority of the caliph
that could hold assemblies of investiture for governofs and other high
officials, including amir al-umari' himself. On the other hand, although
such an appointment was undoubtedly legal, the investitures were
sometimes felt as a kind of mockery, since the caliph had no power
and often merely did what he was told to. The real pou/er remained in
the hands of the amTrs who could ob[ge the caliph, for instance, to
invest a certain figure with certain territories by which he became the
govefnof appointed by the caliph and not mefely the deputy of the
amir.6o
It is true that later on, along with the decline of the Buyids'
powef, the position of the caliph gradually changed. This change was
s Miskawayh, Tbe Eclipn of tbe Abbasid Calipbah,vol.5, p' 330'
5e Thomas \J( Arnold, The Calipbate,p' 61.
e M. Kabir, The Bawalhids Dlus! of Baghdad'p.195.
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more favorable because Baghdad was frequendy left by the Buyids'
am7rs,6r by which the caliph could obtain his authority. In addition, a
new orthodox figure, Maf;mud b. Subektekin of Ghazna,gained pou/er
after defeating the Samanid ruler in Khuzistan, tn 389 /999. Mahmud,
as a new powerfrrl sovereign of his day showed his sincere support
and loyalty to the caliph by writing a long letter of submission. Thus,
as Mafrm[d was himself a Sunnite, his emergence to power promised
a new hope for the revival of the Sunni faith.62
Having such a moral support, the Caliph al-Q;dir Q81,-422/
991,-1031) could exercise his authority to protest against some
innovations introduced by the amir arnd the Shilte leaders. In 394/
1003, when Baha' al-Dawlah appointed Abu Ahmad al-Musaui, an
Alid iurist, as chief judge and chairperson of the Dipin al-Maqilin
(Court of Appeal), al-Qadir protested and refused to accept the
nomination. The amTr then had to cancel his appointrnent and give
him another post excluding that of the chief iudge. Thereafter the
caliph began to defend the cause of Sunnism against the claim of
Shi'ism.63
On another occasion, rn 401/1010, the Shi'ite leader of Mousil,
Qirw-sh b. Muqallad, ptoclaimed his allegiance to the Fatimid caliph
of Egypt and ordered that the name of this Fatimid caliph, al-H-akim,
be mentioned in the khutbal) nlieu of al-Qtdir. Against this innovation,
the Caliph al-QAdir sent his personal envoy, Abu Bakr al-Baqillani, to
the amir Baha' al-Dawlah in Slilraz to protest it. The latrer, fi"di.g
colnmon ground with at-Qldk in his opposition to the claim of the
Fatimid caliphate, protested to Qirwash b. Muqalladwho then admitted
61 Fot instance, during the reign of 'Izz al-Dawlah Bakhtiyar, because of his
failute to secure the loyalty of the military commanders, he left Baghdad and established
his stronghold tempotarily in Wasit before he could regain his control over Baghdad by
the support of his cousin,'Adud al-Dawlah, n364/975. See Hugh Kennedy,The
Prophx and tbe Age of tbe Calipbates, pp.23l-232.
6'? HiEl b. al-Mul?assin al-Sabi,Dha/KtibTajinb al-(Jnan,ed. H.F, Amedroze
and D.S. Margoliouth (Baghdad: Al-Muthanna, 1914), vol. 4,pp.340-341.
63 M. Kabir, Buwalbid Dlnas! of Baghdad,p. 197, quoting lbn al-Jawzi, al-
Martaqam, vol. 7, pp. 226-227. See also H. Kennedy, Tbe PrEbet and tbe Age of the
Cakpltates,p.247.
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his error and reesablished rhe khulbah in al-Qadk's name.6a
The death of Baha' al-Dawlah in 388/988 allowed the caliph
more scope to exercise his authority.In 409/ 1018 he took a maior
step issuing a decree which condemned Mu'tazilism and Shi'ism and
asserted that the companions of,the Prophet and all the first four calpihs
shotrld be venerated by every true Muslim. This creed, known as al-
RirAbh al-p;diriJah, marks a fundamental development of Sunnism,
since, by this creed, Sunnism was defined explicidy and positively.
Now there was a body of positive belief which had to be accepted by
anyone admitting himself as a Sunni. The acceptance of the veneration
of the first four caliphs, as one of the main issues of the creed, meant
rejecting the claims of the Shits that'A[ had been uniusdy deprived of
the caliphate.6s By this creed also the Abbasid caliph had appeared as a
champion of the Sunnis against the claims of the Twelver Slii'is and
the Fatimids alike. Moreover, he declared that the Abbasid caliphs
held a lsligious role which they could fi.rlfil even if they did not exercise
the teml:oral power. Holding such a role, the caliph now emerged as a
spokesman of the Sunni faith, by virnre of which he could gatn a gteat
body of support from the maiority of the ummab: "The people might
not fight to restore the political power of the Abbasid caliph but many
of them would support the Sunni cause against the pretensions of the
Shi'ah."66
In the meantime, the rise of Mafrm[d b. Subektekin to power,
besides favoring the revival of Sunnite dig"ity, also represented the
emergence of the new pov/er of the Turkish race in Islamic history.
Along with their emergence, the Buyids began to decline and when the
Seliuk sultan Tughrel Beg entered Baghdad n 447/1055 the Buyid
pou/er was swept away entirely. In addition, although the caliphate
now passed under the new guardianship of the Seliukids, the position
of the Abbasid caliphs improved.6T
6 M. K^bt, I b id. ; H. Kennedy, I b i d.65 H. Kennedy,Ibid., p. 242; see also al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, T;;kb BaghMd
(Cairo: Makabat al-Khanji, 1931), vol. 4, p. 38.
6 H. Kennedy, I bid., pp. 242-243.
67 Thomas !( Arnold, The Caliphate, pp. 79-80.
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Finally, it seems necessary to mention that although the Buyids
were professing Shilsm, they did not intend to suppress the caliphs by
imposing their Shi ite doctrines nor destroy the caliphate but rather to
let them maintain their Sunnite traditions. Moreover, considering that
the Shittes were only minority, they must hrve reilized that it would
be better for the Buyids to keep the caliphate under their thumb.
Politically, they could benefit ftom this strategy, both to legitimize their
authodty over the Sunnis and to suengthen their diplomatic relationship
with the wodd outside. By deriving their authority from the caliphate,
the Buyids made it ^ppeat as though they honesdy believed in the
sovereignty of the Abbasid caliphate, although the caliphs were only
the titular heads of state, or merely puppets in their hands.68
2. The Buyid Rule
The Buyid government, ^s ^ continuation of the Abbasid rule,
adopted a decentralization system. This was due particulady to the
factthat there had been more than one center of power for the Buyids,
besides which itwas also imposed on them by their military and financial
weakness. However, this decentralization had a. gre t influence in the
mannef in which there was L te r::angement of moral obligation and a
redefinition of the inter-governmental relationship. Under the Buyid
reign, the state administration became less hierarchical and redundancies
of functions appeared at all official levels. Still more confusing, the
task of each administrative part became less defined and the chains of
command more diffuse.6e
Onginally, this decentralizaion had been favored by the fact
that the vast empire of the caliphate, after having been divided into
provinces, was placed under the administration of governors. These
governors enjoyed powers and privileges according to their ability and
to the weakness and strength of the central govefirment. Therefore,
the governors who were posted to distant provinces enjoyed more
privileges and acted as independent rulers. The great distance also
68 C.L. Cahen, "Buwayhids or Buyids." Tbe EnEchpedia of Islan,2"d edition,
vol. 1, p. 1350.
@ Roy P. Mottahedeh,Loylg and Leadership in at Ear! Islanic Socie! @dlrrceton:
Princeton University Ptess, 1 980), pp. 1 81 - 1 82.
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indirecrly worked in favor of these rulers and the caliph had to grant
them some extra privileges compared to other rulefs of nearef
provinces.To
As has been discussed in the introduction, in exercising his duties
as the head of the Muslimworld, the caliph could delegate his authority
in a special affangement and that dealing with his civil authority he
ddegated it to the viziet. Thus the vizier was the representative of the
caliph as his officer for the civil adminisuation. He held averyimportant
position of power in the Islamic state, whose role, as S.D. Goitein
notes, "has come to be internationally accepted in the sense of prime-
minister with unresticted po\tr/efs."71 This could be clarified, for instance,
by aking an example from al-Muqtadir's vlzier who was reported to
have assumed sole direction of the state and controlled almost all
aspects of the administration.T2
Agreeing with the above reality, al-Maward has recorded in his
treatise, pawinh al-IYaqirah wa Slyisat al-Mulk, that dealing with its
nature, this vjzierate could be either of delegation (tafni/1 or of
execution (tanfdb). In the case of the delegational vizierate, he
maintains that the vizier is entrusted with the full power, while with
the executive wiziente, the v.izier could only enioy limited power for
some specific puqpose. Al-Maward insists further that in both types
of yizie121te, powef was to be exercised udthin certain defined limits
Iaid down by the caliph, based on thp contragrural nature of the
appointment.T3
But during the Buyid regime, this position seemed to have
changed radically. The appointment of the viziet which had been the
prerogative of the caliph was now transferred to the amTr al-mari'.In
addition, as has also been pointed out previously, during the period of
t0 I. Samant4 Theoies of Gownment in Islan (l''iew Delhi: Enkay Publishers,
1988), pp. 85-86.
-ti 
S.D. Goitein, "The Origin of Vizierate and IF Trup Chatactpr." IslamicCiltrre,
vol.16 (1942),p.255.
t2 Ann k.S. Lambton, State etd Goaenmeil in Medieual Islan (Oxford: Oxfotd
University Press, 1981), p. 95.
73 Abi al-flasan al-lvfawardt,pawidn al-lValirah wa-Sradt al-Mt4lk' ed. Ri{wan
al-Sayid (Beirut Dar al-Tlli'ah, 197 9), p. 138.
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pre-Buyid reign of Baghdad (324-334/935-945), the viziers had
gradually lost their real power and they had merely to appear in black
robes on ceremonial occasions, while their affairs were nou/ taken over
by the secretaries of the amirs. This is the tradition that M.'izz zl-
Dawlah (h"ppily) inherited and thus he appointe d the ex-amir al-rmari'
Ibn shirzad as his secetary.Ta Accordingly their vizier was nour only
an official chosen by the amir,whose position was completely different
from that under the caliph.
As a ruler completely under the control of the amir, theposition
of the viziet began to deteriorate, because its holder was left without
any initiative and was always under consant *reat of dismissal. Even
more than only dismissal from their post along with the confiscation
of their wealth, the viziers were frequently ill-treated by their masters
for some misakes they had made. For insance, harsh treatment was
once inflicted upon al-Muballabi the vizier of Mu,izz al-Dawlah, who
got a hundred and fifty stnpes which almost brought him into death,Ts
and upon Ibn al-'Arrid who was blinded and whose nose was cut off
by A,flud al-Dawlah.76 on the other hand, the appoinrment of the vi-
ziers in most cases was obtained in return for some payment. The can-
didates usually either bribed the amTror his men, or promised to pro-
vide them with some money upon their installment. An illustration
was made to describe this case when Ibn Ba{ya who had been only a
supervisor of the royal kitchen could bribe his way into the vizrerarte
under Bakhtiyar rule.Ti
The only Buyid vizier worthy of mention as capable of
maintaining his dignity was Abu 'Afi Ismatil called al-Muwaffag, who
was appointed vizier by the amhBahi'al-Dawlah tn 3Bg/99& After
the re-conquest of Fars, Khuzisan and Kirman, this vizier not only
managed to control these regions but also became almost more powerful
than the an?rhimserf. He controlled the financial affars entirelv and
Pgrhaps this could be the result of the negotiation held by Mu'izz's agent
with himwhile hewas in concealmentupon the arrival ofMu'izzal-Dawlahatsaghdad
n334/946,as has been mentioned above.
75 Miskawayh, Tq'irub al-IJmaa,vol.2,p. 745.
76 Ibn al-Atlfrr, al-Ka-nilf at-Tarikh, vo[. 8, p. 67 5.77 lbid,pp.628-629.
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could even deny the amly's request for a sum of 3,000 dirhams for his
pemonal expenditures.T8 Al-Muwaffaq could maintain the dignity of
his office as such because he rose to the vizierate through his military
queef, as a cofirmander of the army and more significandy because of
his successful campaign in re-conquering Fars and Khuzistan.
Nevertheless, it was because of his own dignity also which seemed to
have brought him into conflict with the amir and after two years of
undisputed power he was arrested in 390/1000.?e
Principally, the Buyid viziers held an important functions in
devising ways and means of raising funds to finance the amTr's troops
and to maintain his establishment. Officially the vizierwas the supreme
head of the dawiuin (sng. d:iwin), or administrative departments. He
had the authority to appoint the heads of these dapiain and to
supervise them. But during the Buyid era these heads of dawiuinasually
owed their office to the amirandwere direcdy responsible to him rather
than to the vizier.e
In running the state organizaion, the Buyids virtually maintained
several central adminisuative departments created under the early
Abbasid caliphs, except for some re-arrangements, particularly of those
dealing with revenue. Some of these departrnents were Diain ol-zuor/,
dealing with the administration of revenue; Dhvan al-Nafaqab, dealing
with the state expenditure; Diain al-Jund, concerning the army; Diwin
al-Birr wa'l-,ladaqit, concerning the charities; Diain al-Tawq|',
concerning complaints of individuals against the decisions of the rulers;
Diain al-NaVzrf'l-MaVglin, the court examining the above complaints;
Diain al-Baid aa'l-Akbba1, departrnent of post and intelligence; and
Dinin al-AqinnaL the department responsible for controlling the
expenditures of other deparffnents.sl
But due to the instability and frequent changes of the viziers,
rhe dawiain under their administration worked haphazardly. Tn 334/
946, soon afterMu'izz al-Dawlah had established his rergn in Baghdad,
?8 Hil-al al-$abi,DhqlKitibTajirub al-Unan,vol. 3, p. 330.
1e lbid.,p.371.
e M. Kabir, The Buwa.yhid Dlnasg of Bagbdad,p. 128.
8t lbid., p. 120n, quoting von Kraemer, Oriert arder tbe Calipbs, tanslated by
Khuda Bakhsh (Calcutta, 1920), pp. 237 -238.
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he had to distribute many crown lands in order to satis$' the demands
of his army. His actions, of course, brought about some disorder in
the state administration and resulted further in the amalgamaaon of
some revenue offices. Along with this amalgamaion, the DTain al-
A{nnab was suppressed. There is no doubt that this suppression was
intended as both the amTr and his favorite officials did not want their
expenditures to be controlled.E2
Since finance constituted the main concern of the state, the
Diain al-Kltaraj remained the most important unit. As an of{ice
responsible for the state treasury, the DTpin ol-KltorA controlled the
revenues derived from the areas under the emirate. During the early
Abbasid reign, there were two sources of revenue: the regions
administered direcdy by the central goveflrment, i.e. Iraq, and the
provinces ruled by the governors. In both areas, fevenues were collected
by the state revenue officials (bnnil, sng. 'inil1. But later, when the
distant provinces began to escape ftom revenue payment, a system of
tax farming, known as /aminab, was introduced. According to this
system, those distant provinces wefe glven either to individuals or
government officen, both civil and military who assumed responsibiliry
for collecting the revenues. In return, th.y had to pay the specified
amount for them to the state treasury. Howeveq this new system did
not solve the problem, since the revenue farmers also began to violate
their obligation by usurping the revenues from their regions for
themselves and even declared their independence from the central
govefirment. This was the main reason used by the Caliph al-Rad to
appoint Ibn Ra'iq n 324/936 as amTr al-umari' in order to handle the
state's financial stress caused by the total stoppage of payment from
the revenue farmers. Finally, since the daninah system also failed to
supply enough funds for the state treasury, especially to satis$r the army
budgeg the caliph was obliged to rry another system by granting fiefs,
not only to military officers but also to the tanks of the army. This policy
inevitably caused a firrther decrease of the sate income and, as a result,
the state treasury had to depend on the irregular sources of revenue.83
82 Miskawayh, TQinb al-U nan, vol. 2, p. 96.
83 M. Kabir, Tbe Bw4ybid Dlnas! of Bagbdad,p.745.
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This was the condition in which Abu Ja'far b. Shirzad had been
appointed amTr al-umari' before he was succeeded byMu'|zz al-Dawlah.
Accordingly, Mu''tzz al-Dawlah began his emirate at a time of gteat
financial stfess and social disorder. Burglary, pillage and murder
ftequently occurred in the capital and neighboring provinces. The
situation was also worsened because of frequent tiots bet'ween the
Shi'ite and the Sunnites. In addition, fight between the Turkish and
the Daylamite troops was quite popular in this period, who fought for
the payment of their salary or for its increase. The failure of the caliph
and the amirs in maintaining public security was virtually the main
cause of the general moral decadences among the people znd "had a
most damaging effect on the civil administration and socio-economic
conditions of the state as a whole."e In addition, as the de facto rulers
responsible for maintaining law and public order, the Buyids could not
rely on the help of the police alone. They had, therefore, to increase
the number of their soldiers. Unfortunately, they only further
deteriorated the situation, because their increase in number meant that
more money was needed for hfuing thetn.ss
Actually, the economic decline of the Abbasid state, as reported
by Miskawayh, had started earlier around 317 /929, because of misuse
of public money by the caliph al-Muqtadir.86 This decline continued
to get wofse under his successors and finally resulted in an economic
ctisis under Mu''rzz al-Dawlah's reign. Mu'izz al-Dawlah, having no
additional sorrces of funds to finance his state administration and his
afmy, was obliged to oppfess the citizens and extort money improperly.
On the other hand, in order to please the higher ranking officers of the
Daylamites, his household and his favorite Turks, he assigned to them
certain estates belonging to the caliph and other estates abandoned by
their o'wners because of public insecurity.sT
e M.S. Khan, "The Effect o f lqd'," p. 290.
85 lbid.,p.29l,.M.Kabirindicates thatapaft fromthe existingcivilgovernment
including various departments, Mu'izz al-Dawlah had to maintain a gfeat numbef of
his troofs, u-o,r.t.d to more than 20,000 men. See Kaby, Tbe Buwafiid D1nasry of
Baghdad,p.146.
- 
rMiskawayh,The Eclipu of the Abbasid Caliphate,vol. 4,p.268' 
-87 H.F. Amldroze,.,Abbasld Administration in Its Decay, from the TEintb al-
(Jman)' The Journal of the Royl Asiatic Sociery (913), pp. 823-824'
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In return for this assignation, these assignees had to pay the
definite sum of money to the sbte treasury annually. They also had to
perform cetain military duties and were subject to detailed regulations
and inspections, at least in theory. Another obligation which also seemed
to be imposed upon them was the maintenance of canals and the
testoration of bridges situated in their lands. This new system, knoum
as iqTi'was actually an alternative affangement of revenue farming
under a new name. But due to lengthy disnrrbances occurring in the
region, the new system did not yield any satisfactory result and in many
cases even the profit went furto the pockets of the assignees. Moreover,
although during this period there had been an improvement of the
agricultural system under their control the cultivation was far ftom
prospering, because their main concern was merely a profit making.&
Flowever, it must be kept in mind that although for a while, the
Buyids could have testored the otder and prospedty of the central
provinces, mainly after the second half of the 4n/10d Century. Some
facts supporting this argument are restated by M.S. Khan on the
authority of some tesources as follows. The revenue administration of
Basra and Ahwaz was restored after having been destroyed by the Baridi
cruel peasants. The restoration, underaken by the vizier al-Muhallabi
could yield plentiful revenue which was regularly transmitted to the
capitd. The toal revenue collected from this area in 358/969 amounted
to 72,000,000 dirhams. Under the emirate of 'Adud al-Dawlah this
total revenue was raised to 360,000,000 dirhams. The success in
collecting this revenue was favored by the restoration of irrigation
system betrween the Euphrat and the T€rir which was also underaken
by Adud al-Dawlah. In addition, A{ud al-Dawlah also rehabilitated
Baghdad after its devastation under the reign of 'Izz al-Dawlah
Bakhtiyar. Beyond these central provinces peace and prosperity was
also enjoyed by the people of Jib-al region under its successive rulers,
Rukn al-Dauzlah, Fakhr al-Dawlah and Mu'ayyid al-Dawlah.s
But this period of economic prosperity lasted fot only relatively
a short time and temporadly, since the Buyid rulers after those above
s Miskawayh, Tbe Eclipse of thc Abbarid Calipbate,vol.5, pp. 101-104.
8e M.S. Khan, "The Effect o f lq\i'l' p. ZOI .
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mentioned could no longer maintain the prosperity of their regions.
Their failure in maintaining this well-being, as Khan further explains'
q/as 4rnong other things due to "their inability to appreciate the need
for long-term economic and social reforms that were beneficial for
their subjects because they had not advanced beyond the level of
pilaging predatory chiefs."eo
Another feason for their economic decline was the extfavagance
of the amirs themselveser and the lack of otgantzaion at the central
government. The lavish expenditure of the couft and the inflated
bureaucracy were not measured up by any grcLtet development of
resources. The exertion of the previously mentioned system of granting
land (/aninah, iqli', etc), was due to the shortage of rcady money to
hire the govefnment officials and the army. In turn this system even
brought about mofe complicated problem, since the governors who
were appointed as tax-farmers for their ptovinces became ,titt"ully
independent rulers, rendering purely legal homage to the caliph, whose
function was reduced to giving formal authoizaion to their tenure of
authority.e2
D. Concluding Remarks
The discussion of the Abbasid state during the Buyid period is
usually represented by its gloomy political condition endured by the
caliphs. The general feature ascribed to them is their being only tinrlar
heals of state and even puppets under the domination of the Buyids,
the de facto rulers. As the heads of the Islamic state, the caliphs of the
period lost their c21pa61ty to function, mainly because of the Buyids'
interference in the house of the caliph. This interfefence was considered
as a vittual usurpation of the caliphal authority. But regarding that the
n lbid.,p.298.
fl An example of this extravagance is referre dtoMu1uz aJ-Dawlah's construction
of his own new paLce (completed in 350/962) for the expense of 
.13,000,000 ditharns,
while the ,t"t. t ."rory *"s virnrally empty and the Daylamite soldlets revolted apinst
him for the delay of their salary payrnent. See Miskawayh, The Eclipse of the Abbasid
Caliphate,vol. 5, p. 105.' 
o/Bernard I-etrlrs,Tbe Arabs in History Q-andon: Hutchinson Univetsity Library,
1968), pp. 14+145.
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caliphs themselves were feeble and unable to control the frequent
outbreaks of disorder and were too weak to impose their authority,
such a usurpation seemed to be naturally justifiable. Indeed this is the
problem faced by jurists of the contemporaneous period, such as al-
Maward, al-Baqillari, and several others. If the caliph was no longer
capable of firlfilling his function, could he be considered as having
violated his obligation? Further, was the caliph to be dethroned if he
violated his obligation? According to al-Maward" if the caliph did not
f'lfil or was incapacitated ftom firlfilling his duties, he had no right to
remain a caliph.e3
On the other hand, the Buyids'domination over the house of
the caliphate could have undeniably enabled them even to abolish this
(sunni) caliphate, if they had wished to. It was quite possible for them
to take out the caliphate from the Abbasid house and established a
new caliphate under the Shi'ite authority as well as to restore the ancient
Iranian monarchy which they had been originally attached to.
our discussion of the Buyids'political emergence has shown us
that an attempt to restore the ancient Iranian monarchy along with the
revival of its zoroasdan tradition was made by Mardawij b. ziw.
But it has also been pointed out that his death was virhully caused by
such an effort which made the subsequent rulers Lwateof the necessity
of showing their attachment to Islam. yet, disregarding such an
awareness, another attempt to seize the caliphate from the Abbasid
house was once again made by Mu.rzz ar-Dawlah, soon after esablishing
his power over Baghdad. He was supported by his Daylamite digniaries
who assumed that being Shi'ites, they had no obligation to pledge
allegiance to the Abbasid caliphs. But some of those who did nor agree
advised him, as reported by Ibn al-Atlitr, as follows:
You are now vrith a caliph whom you and yotr companions do not
consider as deserving his post. If you told them to kill him, of course
they would do sq and make his blood lawfi.rl. But if you summoned
an Alid to the caliphate, there would be some of those among your
companions who assumed that theywere more entitled than the otliers.
e3 Al-Mawardi, al-Alkan at-S ul1hi1ah, p. 25.
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So, if they asked them to kill you, they would undoubtedly do that
too.s
Again, this is another significant consideration taken by the
Buyids to refrain ftom their desire to abolish the existing Sunni caliphate.
In any case, in spite of the fictthatunder the Buyids'dornination
the catiphs lost their executive po'q/ef, it should be kept in mind that
the Abbasid caliphate was still able to maintain its existence and
remained alive even when the Buyids themselves were eventually
chased away. This survival, in addition to the above reason' was also
because the maioriry of the Muslim ummah believed that the Abbasid
caliphate should be maintained as a symbol of the legitimate
government and of unity among Muslims.es Still more important than
as a symbol of the legitimate govefnment and of the Muslim political
unity, the existence of this Islamic state is also required by the sltai'ab.
According to Ibn Taynfryah, the Islamic state is necessary for the
establishment of a society devoted to the service of God, which was
only made possible by enjoining the good and forbidding the evil.
However, enioining the good and forbidding the evil is only possible
through the existence of an authority carrying out the legal penalties
of the law. Considerably, Ibn Taynilyah suggests: "Si"ty yean with an
unjust inin is better than one night wittroat a s/Aan."e6
ea Ibn al-Atlilr, al-Kinilf al-Tiikl, vol. 8, pp. 452-453. An Alid mentioned in
this passage was al-Mu'izz li-D-inillah al-'Alaui.
e5 Mottahedeh, Itlalg and ltadersbip, p. 18.
e6 Ibn Tayniyah , al-Sfiasat al-S harfuahf-Is6h al-Ri" wa'l-Rariah, ed. Mulqammad
al-Mubarak @eirut Diral-Kutub al-'Aratiiyah, 1966), pp. 138-139.
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